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ABSTRACT 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidential reasoning has been proposed as a 
generalization of Bayesian probabilistic analysis suitable for classification and 
ident~cation problems. Discriminatory information is given by basic probability 
assignments, a set-based representation of evidential support. The generation of 
support from multiple pieces of evidence uses Dempster's rule, an intuitively 
appealing combining function that employs et-theoretic compatibility checking 
augmented with a numeric calculus to quantify the support assigned to each 
consistent subset. When evidence may be represented as both a basic probability 
assignment and probabilistic support, Dempster-Shafer updating is consistent with 
the Bayesian analysis if, and only if, prior probabilities are uniform and the 
evidence is conditionally independent given the frame of discernment. These 
conditions are extended to define the consistency of Dempster-Shafer updating 
with probabilistic analysis for arbitrary basic probability assignments. The genera- 
tion of support is examined in five families of basic probability assignments. It is 
shown that, even with suitable independence assumptions, support generation 
using Dempster's rule of combination produces results that are not consistent with 
a probabilistic analysis of the evidence. 
KEYWORDS: Dempster-Shafer theory, evidential reasoning, Bayesian 
classification, basic probability assignments 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidential reasoning (Shafer [1]) has been 
proposed as an alternative to the classical Bayesian analysis of evidential 
information particularly suitable for the generation of support when evidence is 
ambiguous or unreliable. The Dempster-Shafer methodology has provided the 
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support generation framework for classification systems (Lowrance t al. [2], 
Yen [3]), expert system shells (Zarley et al. [4], Biswas and Anand [5]), and 
belief networks (Shenoy and Shafer [6]). The popularity of the Dempster- 
Shafer theory accentuates the need for a precise characterization f both the 
benefits and consequences of the departure from the Bayesian paradigm. 
In this paper conditions are established under which Dempster-Shafer 
updating is consistent with the probabilistic analysis of evidence. This is 
accomplished by examining support generation when the evidential information 
utilized by the two methods is directly comparable. The consistency conditions 
for this limiting case are then extended to provide a general criterion for the 
consistency of Dempster-Shafer and probabilistic support generation. The 
consistency of support generation is examined in families of basic probability 
assignments that are obtained by imposing restrictions on the form of the 
evidence. We begin with a brief review of the evidential representation a d the 
support combination rule that make up the Dempster-Shafer theory of eviden- 
tial reasoning. A detailed exposition of the Dempster-Shafer theory is given by 
Shafer [1] and Gordon and Shortliffe [7]. 
2. BASIC PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS 
The objective of a classification problem is to identify a particular object 
from a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of objects referred to as the 
f rame o f  discernment. The elements of the frame of discernment are called 
the hypotheses of the problem domain. The identification process consists of 
obtaining and analyzing discriminatory information to generate a measure 
of support for the hypotheses. In the Dempster-Shafer theory, evidential 
support is represented by a basic probabil ity assignment (BPA). A BPA is a 
functional representation that assigns support to subsets of the frame of 
discernment. Throughout the sequel, the frame of discernment will be denoted 
O = { h I . . . . .  hn}, where the hi's are the individual hypotheses. 
A BPA provides a numeric measure of the support indicted by evidence. For 
clarity, the evidence will often be explicitly included in the description of a 
BPA. 
DEFINITION 1 A basic probability assignment over 0 is a funct ion 
m e : 2 ° ---) [0, 1] that satisfies 
(i) m, (O)  = O, 
(ii) ~A~2 o me(A ) = 1. 
The value me(A) represents he support for the hypotheses in A that cannot 
be apportioned to proper subsets of A. A set A ~ 2 ° is a focal  set of m e if 
me(A ) > 0. The set of focal sets of m e is denoted F(me) .  Support assigned 
to the entire frame of discernment O represents uncommitted belief or 
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ignorance. A BPA whose only focal sets are singleton sets defines a standard 
probability assignment over O. Consequently, BPAs may be viewed as a 
generalization f conventional probability measures. 
An example of Shafer [8] illustrates the representative capabilities of set- 
based support assignment. Sally brings the news that a limb has fallen on his 
car. However, she is considered to be only 90% reliable. There are two 
possibilities: either a limb has fallen or it has not. Sally's testimony must be 
used to determine the support for these hypotheses. "From her testimony 
alone, I can justify a 90% degree of belief that a limb fell on my car, but only 
a 0% (not 10%) degree of belief that no limb fell on my car." The unreliability 
in her testimony neither supports nor refutes either of the hypotheses. The BPA 
representing this evidence is ms({f})= 0.9, ms(O)= 0.1, where O = 
{f ,  ~f}  is the frame of discernment representing the limb falling or not 
falling. 
The ability to assign support o sets provides the capacity for representing 
vagueness and ambiguity. This type of uncertainty is referred to as nonspeci- 
ficity (see Klir and Folger [9] and Klir [10] for a general discussion of 
uncertainty in BPAs). The presence of nonspecificity indicates that the eviden- 
tial information is not sufficient o produce a distinct probability distribution, 
but rather it induces constraints on the probability distributions that could 
represent the information. Thus a BPA may be considered to provide a skeletal 
framework for a family of probability distributions that are consistent with the 
nonspecific information encoded in the BPA. 
Throughout this paper, a probability distribution P(O) over the frame of 
discernment O = {h I . . . . .  hn} will be represented by an n-dimensional 
vector P(O) = [p(h  0 . . . . .  p(hn)]. The ith position of the vector specifies 
the probability P(hi).  
DEFINITION 2 Let  m e be a BPA over 0 with focal  sets A ~ . . . .  , A r A 
probabil ity distribution P = [p(  h t ] e) . . . . .  p(  h n [ e)] is consistent with 
m e i f  fo r  each focal  set A i there is an assignment si: 0 - ,  [0, 1] 
satisfying 
(i) si(hj) >- 0, 
(ii) si(hj) = 0 i f  h j¢A  i, and 
Off) ~h~¢,4, si(hj) = me( A i )  
such that P(hk ] e) = ~= l si(hk)" 
A probability distribution is consistent with m e if it can be obtained by an 
arbitrary assignment of the support for a focal set to the hypotheses in the focal 
set. The function s i specifies an allocation of the support of the focal set A r 
The probability of a hypothesis i the sum of the support assigned to it from 
each focal set. 
DEFINITION 3 The set o f  probabil ity distributions that are consistent 
with a BPA m e is denoted con(me). 
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Several BPAs and their associated family of consistent probability distribu- 
tions are given in Example 1. The final BPA specifies a uniquely determined 
probability assignment. This case, when probabilistic support precisely coin- 
cides with that given by a BPA, provides the basis for the evaluation of the 
consistency of Dempster-Shafer updating and Bayesian support generation. 
EXAMPLE 1 The following are BPAs over the frame of discernment O = 
{ hi, h2, h3} and their associated set of consistent probability distributions. 
BPA m 
1. m(O)= 1 
2. m({hl, h2}) = 1 
3. m({h 1, h2}) = 0.5; m({h 2, h3}) = 0.5 
4. m({hl} ) = 0.5; m({h2}) = 0.3; m({h3}) = 0.2 
con(m) 
{[P , ,P2 ,P3]  IPi > O, pl + P2 + P3 = 1} 
{ [ pl , p2 , 0] i pi > O, Pl + p2 = 1} 
{[x , ,x  2 +y l ,Y2] ix , ,Y i>-0 ,  x, + x2 =0.5 ;Y l  + Y2 =0.5} 
{[0.5,0.3,0.2]} 
In case 3, the set of consistent probability distributions i defined by the 
parameters x l, x 2, Yl, and Y2. Any assignment of values satisfying 
the designated conditions produces a probability distribution that is consistent 
with m({h~, h2}) = 0.5 and m({h 2, h3}) = 0.5. 
It is important to note that a distribution consistent with the BPA m e is not a 
probabilistic interpretation f the evidence . Rather it is the support for the 
hypotheses obtained by processing e. The probabilistic representation of
evidence is given by likelihood information p(e I hi) for each hypothesis h i. 
In a probabilistic analysis, the support p(hi l  e) is obtained using Bayes' rule, 
the likelihood representation f the evidence, and the prior probabilities. The 
role of prior information in the Dempster-Shafer theory will be discussed in 
Section 3. 
In favoring the expressiveness of the BPA formulation of support over 
a probabilistic representation, Sharer [11] states, "One well known shortcom- 
ing of the Bayesian formalism is the difficulty it has in handing ignorance or 
lack of evidence. The difficulty is that the Bayesian formalism requires us to 
distribute our total probability over the elements of O."  Further, to obtain a 
probabilistic interpretation of the BPA that specifies ignorance, " It  is often 
suggested that we should distribute our (nonspecific) probability evenly. But if 
n is large, and we turn our attention to any particular element of O, then this 
solution tells us that the particular element is very unlikely--that there is a 
probability of (n  - 1)/n against it." 
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The probabilistic interpretation of a BPA given in Definition 3 does not 
suffer from these limitations. Rather than forcing the choice of a single 
distribution to represent a BPA me, which indeed requires an assignment of 
support hat is not justified by the evidential information, con(me) requires no 
such choice. The probabilistic interpretation of ignorance is illustrated by the 
first BPA in Example 1. 
The interpretation f a BPA as a family of probability distributions directly 
follows the Bayesian tradition for representing support based on nonspecific 
information. Pearl [12] asserts that it is often the case that "we do not have 
complete information to form a probability model. In such situations the 
Bayesian strategy encourages the agent to complete the model by making 
reasonable assumptions." The set con(me) provides the most general frame- 
work for this procedure, encompassing all possible completions of the 
incompletely specified information. 
The presentation of the Dempster-Shafer theory often is given using belief 
funct ions rather than BPAs. A belief function is a mapping Bel" 2 ° -* [0, 1] 
that satisfies 
O) a¢l (O)  = O, 
(ii) Be l (O)  = 1, 
(iii) B¢I(A 1 U A 2 U " -  U At )  >_ ~ i  BeI(Ai) - ~ i< j  Bel(Ai N Aj) 
+ . . -  +( -  1) t+l I~I(A i N A 2 N - . .  N At). 
There is a constructible one-to-one correspondence b tween belief functions 
and BPAs over a frame of discernment O (see Shafer [1]). The belief function 
corresponding to a BPA m e is defined by 
Bcl(A) = E me(B) 
BoA 
Thus Bel(A) may be interpreted as the total support hat is attributed to the 
hypotheses in the set A by the evidence . 
Although they are equivalent representations, the reasons for employing 
BPAs in the comparison of Dempster-Shafer and Bayesian support generation 
are twofold. The definition of a BPA closely resembles that of a probability 
measure, and the similarities are more easily identified. More important, the 
method of combining evidential support, Dempster's rule, is defined in terms 
of focal sets of BPAs. 
Kyburg [13] proposed an interpretation similar to Definition 3 in which a 
belief function (and hence BPA) is considered to provide upper and lower 
bounds on the family of consistent probability distributions. Moreover, he 
showed that every BPA can be constructed from "a closed set of classical 
probability functions Sp defined over the atoms of O such that for any 
X c O, BeI(X) = min~,~s P P (X) . "  
Shafer [8] asserts that "The fallaciousness of the probability-bound interpre- 
tation of belief functions becomes clear, however, when we consider two or 
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more belief functions addressing the same question but representing different 
and possibly conflicting items of evidence." Shafer's objection will be exam- 
ined in Section 5, where a method of combining families of probability 
distributions i presented. This method, which is not based on upper and lower 
probability bounds, will be shown to be more flexible in analyzing conflicting 
evidence than Dempster's rule. 
3. DEMPSTER'S RULE 
Evidential identification proceeds by acquiring information and updating the 
support for the hypotheses based on the totality of the evidence. Support 
updating uses Dempster's rule, "a  formal rule for combining a belief func- 
tion constructed on the basis of one item of evidence with a belief 
function constructed on the basis of another, intuitively independent i em of 
evidence so as to obtain a belief function representing the total evidence" 
(Shafer and Tversky [14]). 
Dempster's rule consists of two distinct components: a simple set-theoretic 
scheme to determine the hypotheses that are compatible with the information 
specified by the constituent BPAs and a numeric calculus to assign values to 
these sets. Let m I and m 2 be BPAs with focal sets A 1 . . . . .  A s and 
B l . . . . .  B t ,  respectively. The value m l( A i) represents support asserting that 
the object is an element of set A i. Similarly, m2(Bj) indicates belief that the 
object is an element of Bj. The intersection of A i and Bj contains precisely 
the hypotheses that are compatible with the support designated by both mt(A i) 
and m2(B2). Utilizing an independence assumption that will be examined in 
Section 5, the support assigned to A i N Bj is proportional to the product 
ml( Ai)m2( B) .  
Focal sets A i and Bj are incompatible if their intersection is the empty set. 
The value 
K= Z ml (A i )m2(B j )  
AINBj=~ 
measures the incompatibility of the BPAs m I and m 2 . The incompatibil- 
ity measure K can assume values between 0 and 1. If K = 1, there 
are no compatible focal sets and the evidence represented by the BPAs is 
considered inconsistent. 
Dempster's rule constructs a BPA that represents he pooling of the informa- 
tion represented by two BPAs m I and m 2. The resulting BPA is called the 
orthogonal sum of m I and m E and is denoted m~ • m 2. 
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DEVrSmON 4 Let m~ and m 2 be BPAs  over O. The orthogonal sum of  
m I and m 2 is the BPA defined by 
(i) m I • m2(~)  = 0 and 
(ii) ml • m2(A) = EA,nB~=A ml(A i )m2(Bj ) / (1  - K )  
fo r  every nonempty subset A o f  O, where K is the measure o f  incom- 
patibility o f  the constituent BPAs. 
Dempster's rule is both associative and commutative, permitting iterative 
support updating. The BPA that represents complete ignorance, re(O) = 1, is 
an identity element for the orthogonal sum operation. Dempster's rule, how- 
ever, is not idempotent. Combining two BPAs that support a single set A and 
O increases the support for A. The increase is proportional to the support in 
the two probability assignments and is similar to the method of combining 
corroborative information using certainty factors (Buchanan and Shortliffe [15, 
Chapter 10]). 
Although intuitively appealing, the conditions under which Dempster's rule 
is an appropriate technique for support combination have proven elusive, 
Sharer [1] has asserted that Dempster's rule may be used when the constituent 
BPAs are based on "entirely distinct bodies of evidence." Clarifying this 
position, he states [8] that "the independence r quired by Dempster's rule is 
simply probabilistic independence, applied to the questions for which we have 
probabilities, rather than directly on the question of interest." Krantz and 
Miyamoto [16] argue that Dempster's rule is applicable only when "there are 
no conceptual relations linking the two bodies of evidence xcept for the purely 
logical relations among propositions supported or contradicted by the 
evidence." They further note that " i f  two distinct observations can be said to 
be statistically independent, hen they must be linked by a common chance 
model" and hence are not suitable for combining using Dempsters rule. The 
notion of distinct or conceptually independent bodies of evidence is a qualita- 
tive judgment about which, in general, the determination may not be self- 
evident. This is true in subjective Bayesian evidential analysis as well as in the 
Dempster-Shafer approach. The objective of the analysis in Section 5 is to 
precisely identify the probabilistic onditions that must be satisfied for the 
application of Dempster's rule to be justifiable. 
In a Bayesian analysis, two distinct ypes of information are combined to 
generate the support. Prior information provides the initial predictive support, 
and evidential likelihoods are obtained to update the belief. In Dempster-Shafer 
theory, the basic probability assignment provides a universal framework for 
the support representation. Due to the homogeneous representation f support, 
both prior information and diagnostic evidential support are represented by 
BPAs. The total support is given by the BPA m e • mpri, where m e is the 
evidential support and mo~ i is a BPA specifying prior information. Dempster's 
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rule is appropriate for combining these two types of support because "it  is 
often reasonable to consider prior experience as entirely distinct from diagnos- 
tic evidence" (Krantz and Miyamoto [16]). As prior information is treated in 
the same manner as evidence from any other source, we may assume that the 
initial conditions in a Dempster-Shafer analysis is that of complete ignorance. 
Prior information, if available, may be incorporated by an application of 
Dempster's rule. 
4. PROBABILISTIC BPAs AND PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS 
To determine the consistency of Dempster-Shafer updating with probabilis- 
tic support generation, we will examine the conditions under which evidential 
information is directly transformable from the Dempster-Shafer representation 
to the representations required for Bayesian belief generation. This occurs as a 
degenerate case of the BPA representation when the focal sets are all singleton 
sets. 
DEFINrrION 5 A BPA m e is probabilistic i f  the focal sets o f  m e are 
singleton sets. The family o f  probabilistic BPAs  is denoted by P. 
Given a probabilistic BPA m e based on evidence , a probability distribu- 
tion P over O is obtained by defining the probability of the hypothesis hi to 
be the value assigned to the singleton set {hi}. That is, p(h~[e) = me({hi} ).
Following the conventions introduced earlier, the probability distribution 
obtained from a probabilistic BPA m e will be denoted by the vector 
P (O le )  = [p(h~le)  . . . . .  P (hn le ) ]  
A probability distribution will frequently be abbreviated by designating an 
arbitrary member of the distribution and omitting the explicit designation of the 
evidence . Thus, P(O[  e) may be written [P(hi[ e)] or simply [Pi]. 
As there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween probabilistic BPAs and 
probability distributions, we will often use these terms interchangeably. Thus, 
we may refer to the focal sets of a probability distribution or the orthogonal 
sum of two probability distributions. In the same manner, a probabilistic BPA 
may be written as a distribution m e = [Pi] rather than as a set function. 
Several properties of probabilistic BPAs are presented in the following 
lemmas. These observations follow directly from the definition of Dempster's 
rule. 
LEMMA 4.1 Let me~ be a probabilistic BPA,  and let me~ be an 
arbitrary BPA.  Then me, • me2 is a probabilistic BPA.  
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LEMMA 4.2 Let me, = [p(h i le l ) ]  and me2 = [p(hi le2)]  be 
probabilistic BPAs. Then 
me, • me2 = [ p( hil e l )P(hi l  e2)/c ] 
which c is the normalizing constant ~.= ~ p( hj l eO p( hj l e2). 
The computation outlined in l.~mma 4.2 is taken to be the definition of the 
orthogonal sum of probability distributions. Thus if P! = [Pi] and P2 = [qi] 
are probability distributions, then Pl ~ P2 is the distribution [ Piqi/c],  where 
c is the appropriate normalizing constant. 
5. BAYESIAN UPDATING 
We now compare Dempster's rule with Bayesian updating to determine the 
conditions under which they produce the same composite support. To compare 
the updating paradigms, it is incumbent that the information required for a 
Bayesian analysis be derivable from the BPAs employed by the Dempster- 
Shafer approach. This occurs when the evidence is represented by a probabilis- 
tic BPA m e over O. In this case, the support for the hypotheses in the 
Bayesian analysis is given by the probability distribution P(O I e) = [ p(h i I e)] 
obtained from the probabilistic BPA m e" 
The transformation from Dempster-Shafer to probabilistic support utilizes 
Bayes' inversion rule 
P(hi  I e)p(e) 
p(e l  hi) = p(h i  ) 
to generate a likelihood value p(e lh i )  from diagnostic information p(h i le  ). 
Support from multiple pieces of evidence can be obtained from Bayes' rule, the 
prior probabilities, and the individual likelihood values when the evidence is 
conditionally independent given the frame of discernment. Formally, evidence 
e~ and e e is conditionally independent given O when 
p( e, ^  e2 I hi) = p(  e~ I hi)p(e21hi)  
for every hypothesis hi E O. When these conditions are satisfied, the support 
for h i is given by 
p(h  i [ e, A e2) = 
p(e,  A e 2 I h,)P(hi)  p(e, [ h i )P(e 2 I hi)P(hi)  
p(e, ^  e2) p(e, ^  e2) 
where the P(hi) in the numerator is the prior probability of h i. 
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The analysis of the effect of applying Dempster's rule to two probabilistic 
BPAs begins by examining the terms in the orthogonal sum and transforming 
them into an equivalent likelihood formulation. Following the discussion of the 
role of priors in Dempster-Shafer updating and without loss of generality, we 
assume throughout the analysis that the prior probabilities are represented by 
the uniform distribution. If predictive information is available, that information 
can be incorporated into the composite support via an application of Dempster's 
rule. 
riP(hi I el)P(hil e2) ] 
me, O me2 = ~,j:-l p(hj[ee-~(hjie2) 
( P(el [ hi) P(hi)/P(el) )( P(e2 I hi)P(hi)/P(e2)) 
= 
E~-=~(p(e, [ hj)p(hj)/p(e~))(p(e2[ hj)p(hj)/p(e2) ) 
P( el I hi) P( e2 I hi) P( hi) P( hi) 
~: j- -l p('el ] h-~(eT [-h-~i ) p~y )-p-(( hj ) ] 
p(e~ [hi)p(e 2 [hi)(1/n)(1/n ) ] 
l (1 / n)(1 / n) ~=1 P( el I hi) p(e  2 ] hi) 
P( el [ hi) P( e2 I hi) 
Zf-_: P (~ i  h-h-~(eEi h~) ] (11 
The first equation is the componentwise formulation of the updated support 
using Dempster's rule (Lemma 4.2). Bayes' rule is then applied to the 
conditional probabilities in both the numerator and denominator. The final 
steps simplify the representation by eliminating the prior and evidential proba- 
bilities from the quotient. The removal of prior probabilities requires the 
assumption of uniform priors. 
Now we examine the componentwise r presentation f the probabilistic 
support for O given evidence I and e 2. This is represented bythe probability 
distribution P(OI e~ ^ e2). The elements of this distribution can also be 
rewritten in terms of the likelihood of the evidence given the hypotheses: 
P(hi I e, A e2) 
[P(hile'Ae2)l = ~j5 1 ~-('h-~'. [ el A e2) 
[ P(hi'elAe2)P(elAe2)/P(h,) ] 
(p (e  I Ae2)/P(hi))~, j= 1p(hj] e, Ae2) 
= [ p(hi[elAe2)p(elAe2)/P(hi) ] 
~'= l(P(hi l  e, ^  e 2) p(e I A e2)/p(hi)) 
= L ~J=' p(elAe2lhj ) ] (2) 
Consistency ofDempster-Shafer Updating 29 
Again, the assumption of uniform priors is required to distribute the value 
p(hi)  throughout the summation. Bayes' rule is then applied to transform the 
support o a likelihood representation. 
From Eqs. (1) and (2), we see that the support generated by the Dempster- 
Shafer approach and by the standard Bayesian analysis are identical if and only 
if 
p(  e, [ hi) P(  e 2 I hi) = P( el A e 2 I hi) 
that is, when the evidence is conditionally independent given the hypotheses. 
By the preceding derivation, the result obtained by combining two proba- 
bilistic BPAs using Dempster's rule agrees with the Bayesian analysis of 
the evidence when the evidence is conditionally independent with respect 
to the hypotheses and the priors are assumed to be uniform. Under these 
assumptions, we say that the Dempster-Shafer and Bayesian support 
generation is consistent. 
Conditional independence of evidence given the hypotheses i a qualitative 
property of the problem domain and the evidence sources. Pearl [17] has 
argued that the dependence r lationships provide the fundamental framework 
of the problem domain. "Once asserted, these dependency relationships should 
remain a part of the representation scheme, impervious to variations in 
numerical inputs." We add that the presence of a dependence r lation is not 
dependent upon the particular formalism used to represent the evidence. Thus, 
if conditional independence is required for consistency when the evidence is 
given in the form of a probabilistic BPA, this qualitative condition persists 
regardless of the specificity of the evidence. Consequently, we will assume that 
the evidence being combined is obtained from sources that are independent 
given the frame of discernment. See Pearl [17, 18] for a discussion of both the 
importance and the nature of conditional independence of evidence in support 
generation. 
In the derivation that exhibited the relationship between probabilistic and 
Dempster-Shafer support, the evidence that produced the BPAs was specifi- 
cally indicted. Throughout the remainder of this paper, a BPA m i will 
represent the interpretation fevidence r For i ~ j ,  e i and ej are assumed to 
be obtained from conditionally independent sources. 
The observation that a BPA represents a family of probability distributions 
permits the notion of consistency to be extended from the orthogonal sum of 
probabilistic BPAs to arbitrary BPAs. Evidence that produces aBPA does not 
provide any criteria for preferring one consistent distribution to another. The 
aggregation of evidential information must be suitably robust o encompass the 
possibility that any distribution consistent with the evidence is a potential 
representation f the support provided by the evidence. Let m,and m 2 be 
BPAs and let Pi and /'2 be probability distributions in con(m 0 and con(m2), 
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respectively. Then, subject o the conditional independence assumption, the 
result of applying Dempster's rule produces a distribution P~ • P2 that is 
consistent with the probabilistic support generated by e I and e 2. Thus, to 
account for every possible completion of the evidence represented by BPAs 
m i and m 2, we consider all distributions that can be obtained in this manner. 
DEFINITION 6 Let m I and m 2 be arbitrary BPAs. Then 
Prob(ml, m2) = { P [ :lPI ~ con(mO, P2 ~ con(m2), 
with P = P1 @ P2 
A probability distribution is in Prob(ml, m2) if it can be obtained 
as the orthogonal sum of a probability distribution that is consistent with the 
information encapsulated in m I with a distribution consistent with m 2. If 
additional information becomes available to refine the evidential BPAs that 
removes the nonspecificity and produces probabilistic information, the outcome 
of pooling the resulting distributions must be a distribution in Prob(m l, m2). 
Thus, in a natural way, the set Prob(m 1, m2) consists of precisely the 
probability distributions that are consistent with the information in the con- 
stituent BPAs, given the conditional independence of e I and e 2. 
Shafer [8] has argued that the interpretation f a BPA as a constraint on the 
true probability of the hypotheses i  incorrect because of the implications for 
combining evidence. He expands the falling limb example (Section 2) to 
consider the effect of two witnesses, Sally and Betty, offering testimony. 
Sally's evidence is interpreted as a 90% degree of belief that a limb has fallen 
while Betty's interpreted as 90% belief to the contrary. As before, let 
O = {f ,  ~f}  be the frame of discernment representing the limb falling or not 
falling. The testimony is represented by BPAs ms({f}) = 0.9, ms({O}) = 
0.1 and mB({-~f} ) = 0.9, ma({O}) = 0.1. Shafer notes that " In this case, 
the two beliefs are contradictory as probability bounds; if the true probability 
of a limb having fallen on my car is 90%, then the true probability of the limb 
not falling on my car cannot also be greater than 90%." The implication is 
that, with an upper and lower probability bound interpretation f a BPA, it is 
impossible to pool highly conflicting information. 
The interpretation f a BPA given in Definition 3 does not fall prey to this 
argument because it does not claim that any of the consistent distributions i  
the interpretation of the evidence. In the Bayesian approach, a distribution 
P(O [ e) is the result obtained by processing the evidence ; the evidence itself 
is represented by likelihoods p(e[hi). Continuing the example, one possible 
probabilistic interpretation of Sally's testimony is given by likelihoods 
p(Sl f )  -- 0.95, p(Sl -~f) = 0.5 and that of Betty by p(B [ f )  = 
0.5, p(B I -~f) = 0.95. The probability of the hypotheses given this represen- 
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tation of Sally's information is then obtained by applying Bayes' rule, 
P( hi I S) = p(  S I hi) p (  hi) / P( e ) 
which yields p( f  I S) = 0.95 and p(-~f  I S) = 0.5, subject o the assumption 
of uniform priors. Upon obtaining Betty's testimony, a composite likelihood is 
obtained using the conditional independence of the testimony, and the support 
is updated, producing p( f  ] S A B) = 0.5 and p( - , f  ] S A B) = 0.5. 
As argued above, the probabilistic interpretation f support updating speci- 
fied in Definition 6 is not restricted by Shafer's observation that the evidence 
cannot be interpreted as a constraint on the true probability. The support is 
pooled in the manner proposed by Dempster's rule (and, incidentally, Bayes' 
rule) on the completions. The distributions P(OI B A S) are computed for all 
possible completions of the evidence. The probabilistic interpretation of the 
combination of this evidence is the set 
Prob(ms, ms)  = {[xy /c , (1  - x)(1 - y)/c]lx >_ 0.95, y < 0.05} 
where c = xy + (1 - x)(1 - y). Intuitively, the effect of the testimony of one 
witness should negate that of the other. This is precisely the case; 
Prob(ms, ms) contains all probability distributions over {f ,  -~f}. 
The preceding analysis of support updating reduced the BPAs to probability 
distributions and applied the limiting case consistency criterion. This corre- 
sponds to "completing the model" in all possible ways and then using the 
completions to determine the cumulative support. A second approach is to first 
apply Dempster's rule to the BPAs and then construct the set of probability 
distributions that are consistent with the orthogonal sum m~ • m 2 as specified 
by Definition 3. The consistency of general Dempster-Shafer updating is 
determined by the comparison of the sets Prob(m 1, m2) and con(m I • m2). 
DEFINITION 7 Let m~ and m 2 be arbitrary BPAs. The orthogonal sum 
m 1 • m 2 is 
O) Consistent if  con(m I * m2) = Prob(m l, m 2) 
(ii) Overconstrained i f  Prob(m l, m2) - con(m I • m2) ~: Q 
(rid Underconstrained if  con(m 1 • mE) -- Prob(m 1, mE) g: O 
where the minus sign denotes et difference. 
Consistency implies that every distribution that can be obtained by the 
probabilistic updating of distributions consistent with the evidence is also 
consistent with the BPA obtained by applying Dempster's rule. Conversely, for 
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every distribution P consistent with m~ • m2, there is a Pl econ(ml)  and 
P2 e con(m 2) such that Pl ~/ '2  = P- Failure to meet either of these condi- 
tions indicates that the application of Dempster's rule produces results that are 
not in agreement with a probabilistic analysis. The orthogonal sum is over- 
constrained when there is a probability distribution P ~ Prob(ml, m2) that is 
not a member of con(m I • m2). Thus there are consistent interpretations of
the evidence  I and e 2 that produce a distribution representing the combined 
effect of the two pieces of evidence that is not consistent with the information 
represented by the orthogonal sum. In this case, applying Dempster's rule 
overconstrains the generation of support and excludes legitimate possibilities 
from the set of updated probability distributions. Underconstraint occurs when 
the orthogonal sum calculation produces distributions that cannot be obtained 
by updating with any pair of distributions that represent the evidential support. 
Examples 2 and 3 exhibit cases of overconstraint and underconstraint, respec- 
tively. Note that overconstraint and underconstraint are not mutually exclusive 
conditions. 
Pictorially, the notion of the consistency of the orthogonal sum of two BPAs 
is illustrated by the diagram in Figure 1. The information in the BPAs being 
combined may be analyzed in two ways: First interpret the information in the 
BPAs (as probability distributions) and then combine the results or, alterna- 
tively, combine the BPAs using Dempster's rule and then interpret the result. 
The first alternative is depicted by the path from ml, m 2 to Prob(m I, m2), 
and the second by the path to con(m I • mE). If the two paths produce the 
same set of probability distributions, the updating is consistent. 
Although the preceding discussion has focused on the consistency of 
Dempster's rule with the probabilistic analysis of the information, Definition 7 
can also be considered a self-consistency test for Dempster-Shafer updating. 
The construction of both con(m I • m2) and Prob(m 1, mE) uses Dempster's 
rule, the former on the constituent BPAs and the latter on the information 
encapsulated by the BPAs. If the diagram in Figure 1 commutes, the order in 
which the updating is processed is irrelevant. Otherwise, the application of 
Dempster's rule to the BPAs produces results that are inconsistent with its 
application to the information represented by the BPAs. 
m,, m2 , con(m,), con(m2) 
Prob(ml, m2) 
m I • m 2 ~ con(m I , mE) 
Figure 1. Consistency of Dempster's rule. 
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EXAMPLE 2 To illustrate overconstraint, let m~ and m 2 be the BPAs over 
0 = {hi, h2, h3, h4} defined below. 
ml m2 
{h,,h~} 0.5 {h~,h~} 0.5 
{h3,h4} 0.5 {h~,h,) 0.5 
Applying the orthogonal sum produces the same BPA, m I • m 2 = m 1 = m 2. 
ThUS, 
con(m, • m2) = {[x , ,x2 ,x3 ,  x, l lx  l+xz=0.5  , x  3+x4=0.5  } 
c°n(ml)  = {[Yl, Y2, Y3, Y4]lYl + Y2 = 0.5, Y3 + Y4 = 0.5} 
con(m2) = {[zl, z2, z3, z4][zl + z2 =0.5 ,  z3 + z4 = 0.5} 
Then Pl = [0.5, 0, 0.25, 0.25] ~ con(m 0 and P2 = [0, 0.5, 0.25, 0.25] 
con(m2). Combining these produces Pl ~ P2 = [0, 0, 0.5, 0.5], which is in 
Prob(m 1, m2) but is not in con(m I • m2). 
EXAMPLE 3 Let O = {h 1, h 2, h 3, h4}, and let m t and m 2 be BPAs over O. 
ml m 2 
{h,} 0.25 {h,} 05 
{h2} 0.25 {h:,h3,h4} 0.5 
{h3, h,} 0.5 
The orthogonal sum of m I and m z produces focal sets {hi}, {h2}, and 
{ h 3, h4} with values 0.25, 0.25, and 0.5, respectively. The set of probability 
distributions consistent with the orthogonal sum is 
con(m I • m2)= {[0.25,0.25, x3, x4]lx 3 + x4= 0.5} 
In particular, P = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25] ~ con(m I • m2). On the other 
hand, 
con(m1) = {[0.25,0.25, Y3, Y4] [Y3 + Y4 = 0.5} 
con(m:)  = {[0.5, zz, z3, z4]lz2 + z3 + z4 = 0.5} 
Every distribution in Prob(ml, m2) is obtained by the orthogonal sum of a 
probability distribution P ie  con(m1) with a distribution P26con(m2). 
Combining any two such distributions produces a distribution of the form 
Pl • Pz = [0.125c,0.25z2 c, YsZ3 c, Y4z4 c] 
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where c is a normalizing constant. To obtain the distribution P = [0.25, 
0.25, 0.25, 0.25], which is in con(m I • m2), the constant c must be 2 to have 
agreement for P(hl).  Agreement in the second component then requires that 
z2 = 0.5. It follows that z3 = z4 = 0. Thus there are no distributions PI c 
con(ml) and P2 c con(m 2) for which Pi ~ P2 = P, and the orthogonal sum 
is underconstrained. 
Examples 2 and 3 show that updating with Dempster's rule may either 
overconstrain or underconstrain the set of probability distributions that are 
consistent with the combined evidence. Necessary and sufficient conditions 
for consistent updating with the degenerate cases of basic probability assign- 
ments, probabilistic BPAs, and the BPA representing total ignorance can easily 
be established. The BPA over the frame of discernment O that indicates 
ignorance is mo(O) = 1. Recall that the focal set of a probability distribution 
is the set of hypotheses with positive support. 
LEMMA 5.1 Let ml be a probabilistic BPA with focal set F(ml) .  Then 
Pc  Prob(m I , m o) i f  and only i f  the focal set F (P )  is a subset o fF ( toO.  
Proof Let m I = [Pi], and let P be a distribution with focal set F(P )  c 
F (m O. Define P '  = [p~] to be the distribution where 
, f c /p  i if Pi > 0 
Pi = / 0 otherwise 
where c is a normalizing constant. Then P '  • Pc  con(m o) [since con(m o) 
consists of all probability distributions over O] and ml • (P '  • P)  = (ml 
P')  e~ P= P. 
Conversely, by Lemma 4.2, the focal set of every distribution in 
Prob(ml, mo) must be contained in F(ml) .  [] 
COROLLARY 5.2 The orthogonal sum m I • m 0 is consistent i f  and only 
i f  there is a set A such that mr(A)  = 1. 
Proof Let A be the set of elements that may receive support from m~. 
That is, A is the union of the focal sets of m 1. Thus, to be consistent, 
con(m I * too) = con(m 0 must contain all and only the distributions in which 
support is assigned to a subset of elements of A. The sole BPA that satisfies 
this requirement is m~( A)  = 1. [] 
LEMMA 5.3 Let m~ be a probabilistic BPA.  Then m 1 • m 2 is consistent 
i f  and only i f  m 2 is a probabilistic BPA.  
Proof By definition, m ! • m 2 is consistent if m 2 is probabilistic. Now 
assume that m 2 is not probabilistic. Then it must contain a focal set A of 
cardinality at least 2. The support m2(A ) can be distributed in any manner to 
the hypotheses in A. It follows that con(m 2) contains more than one element. 
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Consequently Prob(ml, m2) also contains more than one element. However, 
by Lemma 4.1, m I • m 2 is probabilistic. Thus con(ram ® m2) contains only 
one member, and m~ • m 2 is overconstrained. [] 
6. FAMIL IES  OF BPAs 
In the preceding section it was shown that, in general, updating with 
Dempster's rule is not consistent with the evidential information represented by 
the BPAs. Now we will focus our attention on the consistency of Dempster- 
Shafer updating in families of BPAs. A family is a set of BPAs that is closed 
under Dempster's rule. A family is said to be consistent if the orthogonal sum 
of every pair of BPAs in the family is consistent. A family is overconstrained 
if it contains a pair of BPAs whose orthogonal sum is overconstrained. 
Underconstraint is defined in a like manner. 
Families of BPAs occur in classification problems when the type of informa- 
tion obtained enforces a structure on the focal sets of the BPAs that represent 
the evidence. The advantage of imposing restrictions on the form of BPAs to 
be processed is a reduction in the computational requirements needed for 
support updating. Dempster's rule, when applied to arbitrary BPAs, has 
complexity exponential in the size of the frame of discernment. Barnett [19] 
has shown that Dempster's rule can be computed in time linear to the size of 
the frame of discernment when each BPA supports or disconfirms a single 
hypothesis. The consistency of the orthogonal sum with supporting evidence of 
this type will be examined below. Gordon and Shortliffe [20] and Shafer and 
Logan [21 ] generalized Barnett's approach to show that Dempster' s rule can be 
applied in linear time when the sets that are supported or disconfirmed by the 
evidence form a tree under set inclusion. 
We have already encountered three BPA families: the probabilistic BPAs, 
the entire set of BPAs over O, and the degenerate family consisting of the 
single BPA m o. Three additional families are introduced and examined. The 
first two consider cases in which evidence focuses on a single hypothesis, the 
latter when evidential support is distributed to a partition of the frame of 
discernment. A summary of the consistency properties of all six BPA families 
is given in Table I. 
6.1. Odds Families 
Evidential reasoning using an odds family is appropriate when there are tests 
that provide evidence relating to the odds of a single hypothesis. Evidence that 
results from such a test concerning the hypothesis hi has the form m({ hi} ) = 
p, m(O - {hi}) = 1 - p. A BPA of this form will be called an odds BPA. 
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Table 1. Consistency of BPA Families 
Family Overconstrained Underconstrained 
m o No No 
Probabilistic BPAs No No 
Partition families Yes No 
O* Yes Yes 
S* Yes Yes 
All BPAs Yes Yes 
The information provided by such a BPA is equivalent to learning the odds 
P(hi) / (1 - P(hi )  ) of h i. 
DEFINmON 8 The odds family O* over 0 consists o f  all BPAs  gener- 
ated by a f inite number  o f  applications o f  Dempster ' s  rule to odds 
BPAs .  
Every BPA in the O* family has focal sets {hit } . . . . .  {hi ,  } and 0 -  
{hit . . . . .  hi, } for some subset {hi~ . . . . .  hi, } of O. It is easy to show that the 
work required for computing the orthogonal sum of two BPAs of the above 
form increases linearly with the size of the frame of discernment. Let 
ml({hi})  = Pi and ml (X)= x = 1 - ~n = , i= i Pi, where X = { h i [ Pi 0} 
and m2({hi} ) = qi and m2(Y) = y = 1 - ~iL~ qi, where Y = {hil 
qi = 0}, be BPAs. The orthogonal sum is defined by 
m I • m2({hi}) : 
P iq i / c  i fp i>0,  q i>0 
p iY /C  if Pi > 0, qi = 0 
xq i / c  if Pi = 0, qi > 0 
0 if Pi = qi = 0 
and 
m I • m2(X  CI Y )  = xy /c  
where c is the normalizing constant. 
Example 3 illustrates that updating with BPAs of the form in O* families is 
underconstrained. We generalize this to arbitrary frames of discernment with 
I O I > 2. Let m I be a BPA defined by ml({hl}) = Pl,  ml({h2}) = P2, and 
ml(O - {hi, h2}) = P3. A BPA with the focal sets of m I is obtained by the 
orthogonal sum of BPAs that specify the odds of h I and h 2. Combining this 
with additional information indicating that h I has even odds, m2( { hi}) = 0.5, 
m2(O - {hi}) = 0.5, produces the same underconstraint condition exhibited 
in Example 3. 
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To show that O* families are overconstrained, consider BPAs m 1({ hi}) = P, 
ml(O - {hi}) = 1 -p  and m2({h2}) = q, m2(O - {h2}) = 1 - q with 
0 < p, q < 1. The set of distributions consistent with the orthogonal sum is 
con(m 1 • m2) = {[p(1 - q)/c,  q(1 - p)/c ,  z3 . . . . .  zn]} 
But PI = [p ,0 ,  l -p ,0  . . . . .  0 ]econ(m0,  P2 = [0, q, 1 - q ,0 . . . . .  0] 
coon(m2) and P = PI + P2 = [0,0, 1,0 . . . . .  0] ~con(m I + m2). 
6.2. Singleton Support Famil ies 
Another type of BPA may be used when evidence pertains to the possibility 
of a single hypothesis. Singleton support functions, a special case of simple 
support functions (Sharer [1, p. 75]), have the form m({hi}) = p, m(O) = 
1 - p. Singleton support functions are often employed by Shafer in describing 
his metaphor for belief unctions, that of the unreliability of evidential informa- 
tion: " It  is natural to use simple support functions in cases where the message 
of the evidence is clear but where the reliability of this message is in question. 
The testimony of a witness, for example, may be unambiguous, and yet we 
have doubt about he witness's reliability" [14]. Unreliable testimony does not 
provide discriminatory information supporting or disconfirming any of the 
hypotheses. Thus, Shafer concludes, unambiguous testimony completely sup- 
porting hypothesis h i from a witness who is only 80% reliable should be 
represented by the simple support function m({ hi}) = 0.8, m(O) = 0.2. This 
is the rationale used to construct he BPAs representing Sally's and Betty's 
testimony in Section 5. 
DsFiNrrms 9 The singleton support family S* over 0 consists of  all 
BPAs generated by a finite number of  applications of  Dempster's rule 
to singleton support functions. 
An arbitrary BPA in S* has focal sets {hi, } . . . . .  {hi, } and O. The 
restriction on the focal sets again reduces the computation required for 
the application of Dempster's rule. Let m I and m 2 be BPAs in S* defined by 
ml({hi})=Pi, mi (O)=x= 1-  ~i=ln Pi and m2({hi} )=q i ,  m2(O)= 
y = 1 -  ~i~lqi ,  respectively. The composite support assigned by the 
application of Dempster's rule is given by 
ml ~ m2({hi}) = (Piqi + PiY + qix)/c 
m I • m2(O ) = xy/c  
where c is the normalizing constant. Clearly, updating with S* BPAs is linear 
in the size of the frame of discernment. 
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It is easy to see that Dempster's rule overconstrains singleton support 
functions. Let m I be a singleton support function defined by ml({hl}) = 1/n, 
ml(O) = (n - 1)/n, and let m 2 be a BPA that provides the same support for 
h v The orthogonal sum m I • m 2 assigns (2n - 1)/n 2 support o {ht} and 
the remainder to O. Thus, 
con(mr * m2)= {[Zl, z2 , . . . ,  z,,]lzl >- (2n -  1)/n 2} 
Now consider the distributions Pl = /)2 = [1/n, 1/n . . . . .  1~hi e 
con(m l) = con(m2). Pl • / )2  = [1/n, 1/n . . . . .  1/n] ¢con(m I • m2), as 
the first component of every distribution in con(m I • m2) must be strictly 
greater than 1/n when there are at least two hypotheses in the frame of 
discernment. 
Often criticism of Dempster's rule focuses on the normalization after the 
exclusion of incompatible information (see, for example, Zadeh [22] and Smets 
[23]). The preceding example illustrates that this is not the only cause of 
overconstraint i  the application of Dempster's rule. There is no incompatibil- 
ity in the constituent BPAs, yet the assignment of support o the focal sets by 
Dempster's rule is too restrictive to produce the totality of probability distribu- 
tions consistent with the evidential information. 
S* families are also underconstrained. The combination of multiple singleton 
support functions focusing on a single hypothesis ncreases the support for that 
hypothesis. Intuitively, the support prescribed by the combination increases 
more rapidly than the support required by the probabilistic interpretation. A 
proof of this observation is given in Appendix A. 
6.3. Partition Families 
Partition families provide a framework for hierarchic reasoning that reduces 
the combinatorial difficulties associated with updating BPAs whose focal sets 
comprise arbitrary subsets of O. A decomposition i to a partition is appropri- 
ate when there are naturally occurring subsets of hypotheses to which the 
evidence relates. Hierarchic classification proceeds by acquiring evidence to 
select a partition and then entering a second phase of the analysis to determine 
the hypothesis within the designated partition. The advantage gained by the 
hierarchic approach is that the application of Dempster's rule to BPAs over a 
partition has complexity that increases with the number of sets in the partition. 
This provides an efficient strategy for reducing the number of hypotheses that 
need to be examined in detail. 
DEFINrrIoN 10 Let E be a partition o f  0 consisting o f  sets E l . . . . .  E t, 
where 1 < t < [ 0 I . The set o f  all BPAs whose focal sets consist solely 
o f  sets f rom the partition is called the partition family over E and is 
denoted PE. 
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Partition families are not underconstrained. The ability to distribute the 
support assigned to a set to the hypotheses within the set provides the flexibility 
to create distributions consistent with the BPAs m~ and m 2 whose orthogonal 
sums span con(m, • m2). The proof is given in Appendix B. 
It is easy to show that partition families are overconstrained. The argument 
presented in Example 2 generalizes to distributions over arbitrary partitions. In 
this case, though, the overconstraint does not adversely affect the reasoning 
process because it occurs on the hypotheses and not on the partition. Consider- 
ing the partitions as individuals, a partition family may be treated as a 
probabilistic BPA over a frame of discernment with [E  I elements. The 
evidence may be considered a probabilistic BPA over this new frame. Conse- 
quently, at this level the support generation is probabilistically consistent. Once 
the partition is determined, the subsequent analysis may proceed on the 
hypotheses in the designated partition. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer approaches to evidential reasoning 
provide two distinct methods for analyzing evidential information. The 
Dempster-Shafer formalism is particularly suitable for representing nonspe- 
cific and unreliable information. Classical Bayesian techniques, however, 
provide the standard by which all alternative support generation paradigms 
must be compared and contrasted. This paper has proposed a method for 
judging the consistency of Dempster-Shafer support with probabilistic sup- 
port. The analysis is based on the special case when the Bayesian and 
Dempster-Shafer representations are equivalent: when evidential information 
has the form of a probabilistic BPA. The consistency conditions are then 
extended to more general families of BPAs. It has been that Bayesian and 
Dempster-Shafer support generation are consistent when the evidence is 
represented by probabilistic BPAs or when hierarchic analysis is performed 
using a partition family. When the evidential support focuses on a single 
hypothesis, however, the application of Dempster's rule overconstrains the 
assignment of probabilistic support hat is consistent with the evidence. 
APPENDIX A 
To show that the S* family over O is underconstrained, consider BPAs m~ 
and m 2 that provide support for h I defined by mm({hm}) = mE({ha}) = 0.5, 
ml(O) = m2(O) = 0.5. Then 
con(m, • m2) = {[z, ,  z2 . . . . .  z . ] l z  I >_ 0.75} 
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The distribution P = [3/4, 1/(4(n - 1)) . . . . .  1 / (4 (n -  1))], which assigns 
the minimum permissible support to hi and distributes the remainder equally 
to the other hypotheses, is in con(m I • mE). It will be shown that there are no 
distributions Pi ~con(m0 and /92 ~con(m2) such that PI ~ /°2 = P" Choose 
an arbitrary PI = [x l ,  x2 . . . . .  xn] from con(ml).  The sole restriction on Pl 
is the x I ___ 0.5. To produce P ,  P2 must have the form 
[3 /c (4x l ) , l / (4c (n -  1)x2) . . . . .  1/ (4c(n -  1)xn)] 
where c is the normalizing constant 
3 ._L n 1 
- -  + 71  - 
4Xl i=2 4(n  1)xi 
Since P2 must be in con(m2), the first component must be greater than 0.5. 
Thus, it is necessary to find values X l , . . . ,  x n such that x~ > 0.5, Ex  i = 1, 
and 
1 n -0 .5  (3) 
4x 1 3 /4x,  + 1/4(n -  ) (~ i=2 xi) 
For a fixed x 1, the left-hand side of (3) assumes its maximum when x 2 = 
. . . .  x n = (1 - xO/ (n  - 1). Substituting for x 2 . . . . .  x n and simplifying 
produces the one-variable function 
1 
f (x l )  = 
1 + x l (n  - 1) /3 (1  - xl )  
It is easy to show that f (x  0 < 0.5 for all x I in the interval [0.5, 1) whenever 
n > 4. By inspection, if x~ = 1, then PI • P2 #: P for all P2. Consequently 
there is no choice of x I >_ 0.5 that can produce the required distributions Pl 
and P2. It follows that the S* family is underconstrained. 
APPENDIX  B 
In this section it is shown that a partition family of BPAs is not under- 
constrained. Let E be the partition of O consisting of sets E 1 -- 
{hi. I . . . . .  hi,n, } . . . . .  E t = {hi, I . . . . .  ht.,,,}. A probability distribution 
over O will be written 
p:  [p(h l ,1)  ,...E, "P(h1,~,)lP(h21), ,---,E2 p(h2,~2) l . . .  
] P(ht, I)'' ''E' , P(ht'n') ]
grouping the elements of the partitions. 
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Let m~ and m 2 be arbitrary BPAs over the partition E with m~(E i) = Pi 
and m2(E i) = qi. The orthogonal sum of m I and m 2 is 
m I * m2(Ei) = [piqi/c] 
where c = Z~.= 1Piqi. An element of con(m I • m2) , the set of distributions 
consistent with m~ * m 2, has the form 
[ E, E2 E, ] 
P = Z l ,  1 . . . . .  Z l ,  n I [ Z2,1 . . . . .  Z2, rt 2 I " ' "  I Zt, 1 . . . . .  Zt, n, 
where ~L1 zi, j = Piqi /c,  the amount of support assigned by ml • m2 
toEi .  
To show that the Pe is not underconstrained it is necessary to construct 
distributions Pi and P2 such that P lecon(mt) ,  P2econ(m2),  and P~ 
P2 =P.  Let 
el  ~---[Xl,I . . . . .  Xl,nl[X2,1 . . . .  'X2,~21 " "  IXt, l . . . . .  Xt,~,] 
n) with ~j= t xi, j = Pr Other than the restriction on the total support alloted to 
the partitions, the x~,j's may be considered variables whose values will be 
established by future restrictions. 
The construction of P2 begins with the vector 
P2 = X l , l  " ~ X l ,n  I X2,1 ~ " ' X2, n 2 ~ Xt,  nt 
Clearly, Pi * P6 = P, as desired. Unfortunately, P6 need not be either a 
probability distribution or in con(m2). To alleviate these problems, we scale 
P6 to construct 
k,z , . l  k,Z,,n, ] ktzt, t ktz,,n, (4) 
Xl ,  1 X l ,  n I [ X l ,  I Mr, nt 
where 
q' (5) ki = ni j /Xi ,  j 
~-~j= I Zi, 
This normalization produces a distribution in con(m2), but scaling each 
partition by a different value may alter the orthogonal sum. A specification of 
the xi, j's for which k I = k 2 . . . . .  kn produces the desired distributions 
P! and P2- 
Each scaling factor k i may be considered a real-valued function of variables 
xi, 1 . . . . .  xi, nl [Eq. (5)]. Consider the assignment of equal values to the 
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elements in the partition P1- That is, x~, j = Pi /n i .  
(P~ P_.~) qi 
ki ni ~L ,  z i . ; / (p i /n i )  
qi 
(ni/P,)~.~=l zi, j 
Piqi 
ni ~'=, zi, j 
Piqi C 
n iP iq i / c  ni 
where c = Ej=l(P jq j ) .  
Now choose 6 to be the minimum of c /n  i, i = 1 . . . . .  t. We show that 
there are x~, j 's such that 
( ,  ) ( ,  x, ) . . . .  X' = k2  XE, 1 ' " • • , 2 ,  n 2 = k I Xl , I ,  • . . , l ,n  I 
= k , (x ; . ,  . . . . .  x;..,) 
To establish the existence of the x~, j's, a one-variable function k~ is con- 
t l  i str'acted by equating the first n i - -  1 variables of k i. Since the sum ~j=l  
Xi, j = Pi, the nith variable in Eq. (5) is determined by the values assigned 
to the first n - 1 variables. 
qi k;(x) = 
~j=l  ( z i . j l ( x ln i ) )  + z i .n , l (P i -  (n i -  1)x ln i )  
Now k~(p i) = k i (P i /n  i . . . . .  P i /ni)  = c/n r Since l imx~ o k~(x) = O, we 
can choose an x o such that k~(x o) = e _< 6. It follows that k~ is continuous 
on [Xo, Pi] and k~(xo) <_ t~ <_ k~(Pi ). By the intermediate value theorem, 
there is a point x~ in [Xo, Pi] such the k~(x~) = tS. 
This completes the proof, because choosing the x~ 's produces a set of xi. j 's 
that defines Pi and guarantees that the construction of P2 given in Eq. (4) 
produces a distribution that is in con(mE). 
Throughout this proof we have assumed that P(Ei)  > 0 for every E i in the 
partition. If this is not the case for some set El, then zi, j = 0 for j = 
1 . . . . .  n i. Assigning 0 to all hypotheses in the partition E i in Pl and P2 
and following the construction outlined above will produce the desired 
distributions. 
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